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Abstract: 
 
This paper examines the potentials of New Product Committees (i.e. New Product Approval) 
inside investment banks as organizational sites for the development of responsible innovation 
in finance. The manifold interpretations of the notion of responsibility are first briefly 
discussed. The functioning of New Product Committees in the financial services industry is 
then presented in detail. The features of New Product Committees are finally appraised in the 
light of the different interpretations of the notion of responsibility. The paper concludes with a 
series of policy implications and recommendations. 
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 Towards a practical approach to responsible innovation in finance:  
New Product Committees revisited 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis of the late 2000s has sparked controversy on the merits and dangers 
of financial innovation, on the responsibility or irresponsibility with which it is conducted. As 
put by Gillian Tett, “the story of the 2008 financial crisis is a story not only of hubris, greed, 
and regulatory failure, but one of these deeply troubling problems of social silence and 
technical silos. If we do not use the crisis as an occasion to seriously tackle these problems, 
then it is a crisis we may well be doomed to revisit, albeit in an innovative new form” (Tett, 
2009: p. xv). General agreement exists on the need to develop a more responsible way to 
handle financial innovation (Crouhy et al., 2008). But measures for the enhancement of 
responsibility in the financial services industry often stumble upon discrepancies between 
principles (doctrines and regulatory guidelines) and practices (ordinary conduct and routines). 
The regulatory appraisal of financial activities is often depicted by practitioners, supervisors 
and commentators alike as being unable to catch up with the increasing sophistication of 
current practice. Financial innovation is in this sense comparable to pharmacological 
innovation: new, synthetic molecules may circulate in the form of recreational drugs before 
the relevant authorities can consider their danger or even know about their existence (Dripps, 
2009; Langlitz, 2009). Furthermore, responsibility is rarely considered an element embedded 
in professional habits, and more often seen as an external or complimentary constraint that 
would “add” to the practice. A means of responsibility that is culturally embedded would be 
one that is spontaneously and usually present in the interactions existing within the trading 
room of an investment bank or in retail banking branches, which is improbable (Carretta et al., 
2010). 
We characterize a practical approach to responsible innovation in finance as one that 
takes care to internalize responsibility in effective practice and that therefore sets normativity 
within financial cultures proper. What we call a practical approach can also be termed a 
pragmatic approach, in reference to both the mundane idea of practicality and to the 
pragmatist tradition in philosophical thought, with its emphasis on meaning as a practical test 
(Peirce, 1934). We contribute to this approach with a reflection on the features of an 
institutional place that is a venue for the development of a practical approach to responsibility: 
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the New Product Committee. Formed inside banks and investment firms, New Product 
Committees serve as a legitimating device looking into financial innovation at the very 
beginning of the design stage, and deliberating on the potential issues of the innovation under 
scrutiny. New Product Committees reflect on how innovations comply with rules and 
regulations, delimitate tasks and responsibilities inside the financial organization and validate 
the innovation decision. New Product Committees are thus instituted with the purpose of 
organizing and calibrating innovation but also with the intention of fostering accountability, 
consensus and conscientiousness in the innovation process (FSA, 2011). We believe that the 
role of New Product Committees in developing a culture of responsible innovation in finance 
should be acknowledged and also strengthened through a series of measures. 
In order to carry out our reflection, we rely on a combination of the following methods: 
a series of multidisciplinary meetings and discussions with participants from the financial 
services industry and researchers from a variety of academic backgrounds (namely 
anthropology, economics, management, finance, mathematics and sociology), a brief review 
of regulatory texts, and an examination of field cases based on first-hand experience1. In 
section 2, we discuss the meaning of a practical approach to responsible innovation in finance: 
we examine a variety of views on the notion of responsibility and we test their potential 
signification in financial practice. In section 3, we introduce the New Product Committee in 
greater detail and provide contextual elements for understanding its forms and its regulatory 
appraisal. Two stylized cases illustrate how this specific device works and what it consists in. 
Section 4 offers a series of tests relating to the potential of each idea of responsibility 
highlighted in section 2, when faced with the practical situation of a New Product Committee 
(that is, we confront section 2 and section 3). We conclude with a series of policy 
considerations. 
 
2. What is responsible innovation in finance? 
The notion of responsible innovation has been subject to precise definitions in the field of 
technology assessment and in science and technology policy (Schot and Rip, 1997; Guston 
and Sarewitz, 2002). However, instead of focusing on a narrow, pre-established understanding 
                                                 
1. The cases accounted for in this paper are drawn from two sources: the experience of group members 
participating in the project, and participant observations in two different organizational settings (a bank holding 
and a brokerage house). These experiences took place mostly in France and the UK. We also held a series of six 
plenary meetings between July 2010 and June 2011, completed with a number of ad hoc meetings.  
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of responsible innovation, we unfold a variety of ways to make sense of this notion in the area 
of finance. We list possible and sometimes divergent answers to the following question: when 
can a particular financial innovation said to be responsible and what exactly makes it 
responsible? For each answer, we outline directions for philosophical or ethical grounding and 
indications about practical implications. In short, we imagine the kind of world that the 
particular answer requires: this translates into different focal views on responsibility that we 
put to the test of the New Product Committee in subsequent sections. The focuses we provide 
in this section are not ordered in any particular fashion: they are just perspectives that 
emerged from our discussions, and should be understood as such. Our intention here is not to 
determine or impose any hierarchy on these perspectives.  
 
2.1. Focus on function 
One possible interpretation of the question could be: a responsible innovation in finance is 
one that respects the functions of finance in the economy. This refers to a functionalist view 
of financial innovation, as put forward by authors such as Silber (1983) or Merton (1995). 
Financial innovation is justified when it serves the economic functions of finance, which are, 
according to Merton, the provision of a medium for exchange, the funding of economic 
enterprise, the transfer of resources, the management of risk, the coordination of distributed 
decisions and the resolution of problems of asymmetric information (Merton, 1995, p. 463 
sq.). This refers to functions that are considered positive by the functionalist proponent: this 
presupposes that the ethical debate on whether or not a function consisting in making money 
with money is good or bad (and for whom or for what) has already been settled. All in all, this 
focus requires the presence of a moral, and perhaps also scientific, authority that defines what 
the right (understood as both correct and good) functions of financial innovation are. On a 
practical level, this translates into the importance of a supervisory view: a regulator, best 
depicted as an external, disinterested economist, is observing what is going on, analyzing this 
in terms of general functions previously defined, and providing an assessment that may 
subsequently be taken into account in measures of sanction or reward (Bernanke, 2008; Gray 
and Hamilton, 2006; Spencer, 2000). 
 
2.2. Focus on moral rules 
A comparable but slightly different view would emphasize moral rules. A responsible 
innovation in finance would be one that is authorized with regards to superior moral 
principles. Here the major reference is to ethics, especially the Kantian tradition in moral 
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philosophy (Longuenesse, 2005): Kant’s categorical imperative or other comparable rules of 
mutual consideration and reciprocity dictate conduct and translate into collective good and 
order. This requires some type of shared cultural code or of social apparatus for policing 
individual behaviour: mechanisms of exclusion may therefore be implemented in order to 
remove faulty agents from regular collective life. From a practical financial viewpoint, this 
frame of understanding best translates through solid regulatory authorities, with a strong 
emphasis on the soundness of principles that ought to be imposed, as suggested by the 
literature on financial ethics (McHugh, 2006). Views on responsibility in financial innovation 
that explicitly focus on the respect for environmental and social requirements, and which 
explicitly mobilize ideas of reciprocity, remediation, solidarity and ecological order also 
contribute to this type of focus on moral rules (Blommenstein, 2006). 
  
2.3. Focus on internalized values 
A further nuance in the interpretation of responsible innovation in finance leads to focus on 
internalization. A responsible innovation in finance would be one that is carried out by agents 
with intrinsic moral values. Here we are still close to the Kantian view, but with a strong 
emphasis on the subjective, personal perception of conduct, and with a philosophical view of 
ethics as something distinct from morals (Ricoeur, 1990). The notion of values, as put forward 
for instance in the sociological tradition, is central (Weber, 1904; Parsons, 1966 and 1979). In 
short, patterns of conduct work well when they are internalized in the form of personal values. 
On a practical level, this sort of position leads quite naturally to stressing education, as 
educational institutions appear as the paramount vehicle for the transmission of values. In the 
field of finance, this standpoint corresponds to a pedagogical view of responsibility. The civic 
education of elites, the introduction of ethics in curricula for the professional development of 
business people, instilling values among students of business administration are among the 
measures that characterize this understanding. The MBA Oath at the Harvard Business School 
serves as an example of this type of struggle to make future financiers more responsible 
(Khurana, 2007).  
 
2.4. Focus on aggregate consequences 
Another way of tackling the problem of responsibility would consist in focusing on 
unintended negative consequences of innovation. A responsible innovation in finance would 
then be one that considers the effects of its own diffusion. Some aspects of the categorical 
imperative and its modern expression are also visible in this frame, with emphasis on the 
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temporal dimension (Jonas, 1979). Responsibility is about taking stock of the consequences of 
today’s action on the state of the world tomorrow. The responsible innovator has to imagine 
how the world would look like if the innovation successfully spreads and also if other actors 
start copying it and disseminating it further (a responsible innovation would be one that could 
be fully promoted, even in the event of its appropriation by every other actor within the 
considered field). Reference to outstanding superior principles is less pregnant than in other 
interpretations of responsibility. What counts, first and foremost, is accounting for the effects 
of action. There is a neat emphasis on the economics of negative externalities and also on 
reflexive modernization and the risk society (Beck, 1986; Giddens, 1984 and 1990). In the 
practice of financial innovation, these intuitions often translate into pleas for more and better 
modelling and forecasting, for simulating extreme conditions, for developing models about 
the diffusion of models, and so forth (Hutter, 2005). In short, responsibility means more 
science, although this proves sometimes impractical and also prone to further escalation. 
 
2.5. Focus on accountability 
Our fifth interpretation of responsibility focuses on action, to the authorship of action rather 
than to the principles that may guide it. A responsible innovation in finance would be one for 
which responsibility can be traced and for which an author is ready to acknowledge liability. 
Here the strong idea is that there is an identifiable respondent: the innovator does not escape 
its creature, willingly remains present and cares for it even if the innovation turns out to be 
awkward and burdensome. Philosophical elaborations of the idea of the respondent have been 
proposed in this direction: to be responsible is to answer for something and towards someone 
(Lévinas, 1961 and 1972; Hache et al., 2010). The idea of the signature working as the trace 
of an author and as a device for the attribution of authorship (hence, responsibility) is also 
close to this viewpoint (Agamben, 2008). A financial world that corresponds to this 
understanding is a world in which actions are traceable, a world in which signature is critical, 
a world of disclosure and attribution of liabilities, a world of audit2. More generally, the 
practices of verification that have come to characterize what researchers in accounting studies 
have called the audit society (Power, 2007) exemplify this idea of responsibility as 
accountability. 
 
                                                 
2. In this respect, we may think about the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which somehow fostered a new practical 
culture of signature attempting at tracing responsibility down to an individual level. 
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2.6. Focus on precaution 
Another process-oriented way of making sense of responsibility is in terms of precaution. 
Along this line of thought, a responsible innovation in finance is one that is developed within 
a safety net. The so-called precautionary principle comes here to the forefront, a principle that 
is not to be understood as the impossibility to innovate but rather as the necessity to try to 
delineate a rescue path. Innovating with care, avoiding excesses, considering proportions and 
scope of engagement are all characteristics of this understanding, which connects with a 
Spinozist tradition in ethics (Deleuze, 1981) or Canguilhem’s philosophy of disease 
(Canguilhem, 1943). Emphasis is put on the experimental nature of the innovative act, and 
thus on the shift from laboratory experiments to real scale situations. In the field of 
pharmacovigilance for example, the market is recognized as a genuine testing site, a place in 
which a drug recall can be swiftly organized (Daemmrich, 2004). Precautionary ratios of all 
kinds serve this viewpoint in the financial services industry, starting with minimum capital 
requirements defined in the Basel Accords (BCBS, 2006). A hypothetical financial world that 
would be configured along ideas of precautionary responsibility would be one characterized 
by frequent moratoria on the release of new financial products, by the definition of 
experimental perimeters, by surveys and indicators that monitor the effects of particular 
products and by instituted methods for recalling products. Banks that withdrew from the 
subprime credit securitization market in 2007 in response to signals of pricing flaws 
recognized this type of notion. The same point can be made with Basel III and the creation of 
new “capital conservation buffers” corroborates this view (BCBS, 2011). 
 
2.7. Focus on democracy 
Finally, responsibility could also refer to inclusive debate and to the empowerment of 
stakeholders. A responsible innovation in finance is one that would be rendered discussable 
by all concerned parties. As in other fields of innovation, financial innovation is not exempt 
from controversy. But, as has been shown in the field of science and technology studies, 
controversy is a characteristic of the advancement of science (Latour, 1987). Literature on the 
democratic governance of science, on participatory innovation, on deliberative polling, 
consensus conferences and other advances for the participation of the public in technical 
controversies has examined the relevance of democracy in fields as diverse as nanotechnology, 
nuclear policy, medicine and biotechnology (McCarthy and Kelty, 2010). The notion of 
hybrid forum refers in this field to assemblies of informed, concerned parties that assume 
collective responsibility for one particular issue through their involvement in decision-making, 
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especially in situations where the consequences of action are highly uncertain (Callon, 2007, 
Callon et al., 2009). Several initiatives in the field of corporate social responsibility openly 
point towards this type of direction (Basu and Palazzo, 2008), through emphasis on a 
stakeholder approach (Freeman, 1994). For example, some initiatives in project finance 
openly include measures of public participation in the strategic decisions involved in large 
infrastructure projects (Van Gelder and Vander Stichele, 2011). A financial world that would 
fully comply with this viewpoint would, for instance, be one in which a hybrid forum is 
constituted for every important act of innovation. 
 
We have listed seven possible notions of responsible innovation in finance: each points to 
different philosophical requirements and to different empirical arrangements. Some would 
clearly require the presence of a supervisory, transcendental observer, endowed with 
particular forms of knowledge and authority, and informed by a series of precepts, while 
others focus more centrally on self-sustained procedures and on the intrinsic characteristics of 
practice. Some rely more evidently on the moral qualities of the innovator, while others 
favour a more distributed, less personal view of responsibility. As we have seen, each view 
matches different financial worldviews. Do we need more regulation? If so, do we need hard 
rules like imposed ratios? Or, should soft rules requiring contextualized interpretations be 
pushed forward? Do we need more education, more socialization to responsibility? Or do we 
need more feedback, more information and more science? All the options that we have 
outlined in this section are interesting in themselves, and also in combination with each other. 
The crucial test is now how practical they are, that is, how they can be embedded into the 
ordinary day-to-day practice of the financial services industry. For the test to materialize, we 
have chosen a particular place that is in our view of very high potential interest for the 
practical realization of responsible innovation in finance. 
 
3. A practical place for responsibility: New Product Committees 
In the financial services industry, the New Product Committee corresponds to a local instance 
where innovation is discussed (BCBS, 2008; CCLRF, 2005; JFSA, 2007; FSA, 2011). It is a 
device fostering responsible innovation and, among other things, a venue for debating, 
discussing and describing new financial products and activities. Considerations on the 
consequences, the compliance with regulatory frameworks and the attribution of 
responsibilities take place within this device. In this section we highlight some regulatory and 
institutional aspects, we provide two case-based examples of the ordinary operation of New 
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Product Committees in the financial services industry, and we offer a critical commentary on 
the practical issues that characterize New Product Committees (hereafter NPCs). 
 
3.1. Institutional and regulatory aspects: elements for a tentative genealogy 
New product approval processes have been in use for quite a long time, for instance taking the 
form of project development groups. However, it seems that the institutionalization of NPCs 
occurred quite recently. Traces of their emergence may be found in the framework of the 
Basel II Accords (BCBS, 2006), more precisely in an annex relating to the third pillar (market 
discipline), and discussing the evaluation and assessment of models3. Starting with this idea, 
local regulators have been introducing the idea of a mandatory approval for new products.  
The Japanese Financial Services Agency mentions an obligation relating to the 
“Handling of Screening of New Products” (JFSA, 2007, p. 9), translated on the organizational 
level by a division or a committee in charge of New product approval4. In France, the revised 
regulation CRBF 97-02 makes it mandatory for credit institutions (banks) and investment 
firms (e.g. brokers) to formalize their assessment of the risks incurred by the creation of new 
activities and new products5. While the French regulation does not explicitly specify the need 
for a committee, collective decisions about financial innovation are being made through this 
institutionalized form (AMF, 2006). In the UK, a recent discussion paper issued by the FSA 
underlines an “intensive supervisory approach” to new product development and assessment, 
and leaves almost no doubt about the necessity of such venues for debate. This makes it clear 
that regulation is moving from an a posteriori standpoint to an embedded form of monitoring, 
which takes place within the innovation process, in order to intervene “earlier in the product 
chain if necessary, to anticipate consumer detriment and choke it off before it occurs” (FSA, 
                                                 
3. BCBS (2006, p. 267): “To the extent that the internal model relies on proxy market data, for example for new 
products where three years of historical data may not be available, internal policies must identify suitable proxies 
and the bank must demonstrate empirically that the proxy provides a conservative representation of the 
underlying risk under adverse market conditions”. 
4. JFSA (2007, p. 9) mentioning a “system to have [new products] priory subject to screening and approval 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘New Products Approval)’ by a division in charge of screening New Products or a 
committee in charge thereof”. 
5. CCLRF (2005, art. 11-1): “Reporting institutions shall draw up specific procedures for assessing compliance, 
including: procedures for systematic prior approval, including a written notice from the compliance officer or a 
person duly authorized by the compliance officer for the purpose, for new products or changes to existing 
products with significant implications for the institution or the market”. 
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2011, p. 16). Similar attention to the reviewing process can be found in recent publications 
from industry associations in the US, somehow reiterating concerns expressed by NASD 
regulations6.  
All these elements account for the formal multiplicity that can be found in regulatory 
regimes assessing innovation in the financial industry. Turning to investment firms and based 
on our observations, we distinguish at least two different types of NPCs aimed at assessing on 
the one hand either one or several dedicated transactions; and on the other hand the 
dissemination of a new product, or the ability for clients to access new markets. These two 
distinct purposes, while accounting for internal processes constructing a procedural 
certification within the financial institution are described in the following section. 
 
3.2. Ordinary operations 
We now describe how NPCs operate on a day-to-day basis: we provide two examples relating 
to different types of NPCs, grounding in different institutional contexts: (a) the opening of an 
access to a new market within a brokerage house, (b) the construction of a complex derivative 
in an investment bank. 
 
3.2.1. Offering access to a new market (Case #1) 
Broker A is a pan-European brokerage house based in Paris with offices in a dozen countries 
in Europe and the US. As the company is a middle-sized organization with approximately 800 
employees, it is able to centralize the NPCs at the headquarters in Paris. The NPCs we 
observed took place in a meeting room, and could be extended to external locations through 
the use of conference calls and video transmissions. Gathering people to assess the risks 
incurred by the development of a new product implies a presentation: hence the role assumed 
by the Organization Department, who would send an email providing elements to be 
discussed, usually in the form of a PowerPoint presentation. These presentations would 
afterwards serve as a support during the assessment process, from initial questions to 
(sometimes partial) solutions. The documentation would be archived in a database accessible 
                                                 
6. SIFMA (2011): “While suitability requirements and other sales practice obligations attach to the recom-
mendation and sale of a product, adequate procedures for reviewing new products before they are offered to the 
public can greatly enhance a firm’s ability to detect and avoid conflicts, unsuitable recommendations, and other 
problems before violations occur”. 
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online by every concerned person within the company, and the collective approval 
materialized through electronic signature. 
During the meeting, these presentations describing the proposed set-up and the options 
to be discussed help framing the discussion, opening and closing sinuous paths in the product 
design process. After a brief introduction explaining the purpose of the activity and detailing 
the timeframe for its development, every NPC representative (heads of concerned 
departments or their delegates) has the possibility – if not the obligation – to ask questions 
about specificities and concerns, and to express his or her opinion, but also conditions for his 
or her approval. Members would join relevant documentation (regulatory texts for instance, 
provisional accounting patterns or technical specifications) and summarize for the assembly 
the issues crystallising within the new product. The “to do list” would then be determined, and 
supplementary tasks would be distributed. For innovations requiring more than one gathering, 
the “kick-off” meeting would see the presence of everybody, even those of the NPC members 
who know that they would not be directly involved with the innovation. The reason for this is 
that the Organization Department in charge of the NPC preparation was not always in a 
position to list all the elements that could impact the activity.  
In the case of the opening of a new access to the Cyprus market, the idea came from 
discussions between a client, a sales and the management: expressions of interest materialized 
internally with the gathering of a “Cyprus NPC”, the very formalized sign that newness 
appeared as a consequence of a developing activity in south Europe. The NPC offers a place 
for the expression of multiple concerns, ranging from the typology of accepted instructions, to 
the possibility to use trading algorithms or do block trades. Back and middle-office 
departments would ask questions about the timeframe for the cash and settlement cycle, the 
warehousing accounts, the delivery failures and other buy-in procedures, while the IT 
department would focus the debate on testing environments for managing connectivity issues 
and exchange requirements as regards the technical identification of traders. The compliance 
and control department would look into the local structure of regulation, ask for any 
restrictions (such as short selling, account segregation, accepted market practices) and raise 
potential concerns regarding market abuse, anti-money laundering or the robustness of the 
clearinghouse. 
What we can see here is a hands-on set of simple though fundamental queries, 
encompassing both questions on future practices (once the access would be open to the firm’s 
clients) and the consequences of this reconfiguration of routines within the company. Efforts 
to measure the impact of the new activity are therefore constructed. Discussions would be 
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moderated by the NPC President or the Organization Department, who in the end would ask 
every participant to provide his or her approval, whether pending conditions or not.  
 
3.2.2. Organizing new product approval processes (Case #2) 
Bank B is a global investment bank, present in more than sixty countries all over the world. 
Within Bank B, as is usually the case in similar institutions, new products or new activities 
are distinguished from complex or non-standard transactions approval. The case described 
here qualifies as a NPC. 
Within Bank B, the business sponsor, that is to say the officer in charge of the 
transaction, is responsible for the preparation of the NPC. The committee in itself is organized 
as follows: a Chairman, who is a senior representative of the business, is responsible for 
making the final decision, once permanent members (risk, compliance, legal, tax and finance 
department senior representatives) and invited members (appropriate representatives 
appointed after discussion with the business sponsor, e.g. dedicated operational risk or 
permanent control representatives) have all expressed their concerns. Permanent members 
also have the ability to initiate an escalation process, should they deem it necessary, thereby 
temporarily suspending the validating process. Those rare cases would occur when at least 
one of the NPC permanent members thought that the reputation of Bank B (including for 
example issues relating to the management of conflicts of interests) was at stake, or that the 
operational risks were too serious for the NPC to tackle on its own. As NPCs may be held 
locally, local Heads of businesses are involved in the NPC, so as to guarantee that local 
practices and regulations are complied with.  
In this particular setting, and in contrast to the organization in force within Broker A, the 
business sponsor assumes a greater responsibility, as he is in charge of preparing and 
documenting the pivotal elements within the NPC repository (a database where all relevant 
information is stored, together with the NPC minutes and approval). The document prepared 
by the business sponsor describes the features of the new product, and identifies the resulting 
impacts for the bank, including but not limited to the booking, valuation and risk management. 
Based on this document, members of the NPC have to provide a written statement to the 
business sponsor, justifying their position on the new activity or product under scrutiny. In 
order to get a new product approved, the sponsor starts by organizing informal one on one 
meetings with the different functions in the bank to get their reaction. These are followed by 
long email chains involving several participants. The final committee is an open meeting with 
all members, allowing for the review of the new product taking into account every different 
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perspective, so that final misunderstandings and disagreements can be expressed and dealt 
with. Once the validation has been granted by the NPC, the approval is valid for a 12-months 
period, unless agreed differently, before the NPC gathers to reassess the product. 
Within Bank B, the Operational Risk Department assumes a complimentary role: not 
only does it take part to the NPC process, but it is also responsible for a preliminary 
assessment of the risks generated by the new product, especially with regard to operations and 
information technologies. Furthermore, the department has a duty to review the processes 
linked to the new product, together with the related potential incidents, three to six months 
after the launch of the activity. 
  
3.3. Practical issues and critical diagnosis 
In light of these descriptions, we can raise a series of practical questions. The first concerns 
the openness of NPCs in the financial services industry. How inclusive are they? Who attends 
meetings and who participates in view-sharing and decision-making? NPCs in the financial 
industry are generally open to a multiplicity of parties, but limited to the internal perimeter of 
the credit institution or the investment firm. Some financial activities such as project finance 
make it mandatory to enlarge the number of interested parties (Wright and Rwabizambuga, 
2006). In fact, the examination and validation of projects in this area requires discussion with 
the many stakeholders involved, directly or indirectly, in the project (e.g. the building of a 
giant dam might involve the relocation of local populations). In the case of mutual banking or 
financial services associated to industrial cooperatives, there might even be other unusual 
stakeholder representatives. To our knowledge and until now however, there is no widely 
shared practice of widening the NPCs perimeter to external concerned parties (most probably, 
as a direct consequence of issues of strategy and competition).  
The second question is on voice and decision-making mechanisms. How are debates and 
discussions organized? Who can raise issues? How are decisions taken? The general 
observation is that the current practice of NPCs is in principle open to the expression of 
multiple viewpoints: relevant departments inside the bank can raise concerns about routine 
back-office tasks, issues in regulatory compliance, risk analysis or the commercial relevance 
of the innovation (have clients really expressed an interest in this innovation?). Our 
observations though tend to underline the organizationally-embedded character of NPCs, 
which are very dependent on the local culture of the financial firm. In some cases, for 
example, a marked sense of hierarchy, an over-emphasis on competition and profit or a harsh 
climate of professional progress may lead to situations in which some actors refrain from 
 14
expressing concerns, or are even sometimes simply not heard. In any case, and to the best of 
our knowledge, there is no widely disseminated template for the governance of participation 
in NPCs, apart from what is fixed in the internal procedures of each financial institution. 
The third question is about the types of risks that are produced and examined, when 
referred to the potential behaviour of the financial innovation under discussion. How are those 
externalities considered? Are there multiple ways of simulating the potential effects of the 
innovation? How are these simulations understood and used? A robust risk department, fully 
independent from business lines and directly reporting to the top management, can play a 
pivotal role, as we have seen with Bank B. Another question that needs to be raised here is the 
idea of reversibility: in fact, regulatory texts mentioning NPCs (see 3.1.) usually make it clear 
that a cyclic revision process needs to be implemented, so that the consequences of new 
product dissemination can be regularly reassessed, as is exactly the case with classical risk-
management procedures: “To avoid having a program that operates on autopilot, an 
organization must continuously reassess its risks and controls and communicate with all 
employees who are part of the compliance process” (Schmidt Bies, 2006). Discussions 
relating to the appropriateness of further developments, or on the contrary on backward 
preventive steps can therefore occur before the innovation is too widely disseminated, and 
hence difficult to restrain.  
The fourth question concerns the attribution of responsibilities. How are responsibilities 
distributed? How is accountability determined? Within NPCs, the decision to go ahead with a 
financial innovation usually results in the production of documents signed by involved parties 
(e.g. electronically, as at Broker A), which therefore certify that signatory parties are made 
accountable. Decisions also translate into the distribution of tasks: for instance, the decision 
concerning the release of a complex new financial instrument will specify which back-office 
structure is to handle it and thus take responsibility for issues relating to the clearing and 
settlement of transactions. 
The fifth question is about records and databases. How is information stored and 
specifications recorded? Do NPCs always constitute a sort of organizational memory of 
innovation decisions, the circumstances within which they originated and their consequences? 
And who can access the data repositories to gain knowledge or audit the innovation process? 
Within Broker A and Bank B, follow-ups, reviews and audits are included within the 
organizational architecture leading to expressing concerns and to the traceability of decisions, 
thereby contributing to the development of internal organizational learning. A supplementary 
question can however be formulated here: is it possible to imagine that some elements 
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pertaining to the NPC be made public? Indeed, the purpose and development of NPCs could 
potentially benefit a larger audience. We conjecture that positive outcomes could be generated 
from a wider appropriation of innovation assessment awareness. 
The sixth question is about the definition of novelty. How are products or processes 
considered as “new” or not? This is probably a difficult question, since NPCs are sometimes 
seen as an administrative burden, impairing the true nature of innovation (employees from 
business lines generally hold this view). There is often a struggle in the definition of what 
novelty is, precisely in order to avoid calling an NPC related to the specific object under 
consideration. Contrary to project management committees, NPCs are not always popular 
among bank employees. The fact that NPCs somehow produce legitimacy and allow new 
products to join the chain of existing products may not be sufficient to make it an attractive 
feature. Efforts towards NPC avoidance within some departments at Broker A revealed this 
point. 
The seventh and final question we raise is about compliance: how is compliance with 
rules and regulations assessed? Within NPCs, compliance officers (or comparable risk-
professionals in charge of regulatory verification inside the financial firm) are not only 
present: they usually have the right to veto the development of a new product. The continuing 
institutionalization of risk and compliance functions within financial firms (Power, 2005, 
2009) could indeed trigger a new kind of relationship towards innovation, where discussions 
with regulators, whenever needed, can take place in order to get approval or pre-investigate 
official positions on some aspects and specifications of the product under consideration. 
These kinds of interactions are usually smooth but they are sometimes characterized by a 
phenomenon of double bind (or pragmatic paradox) in which the compliance officer is caught 
between contradictory commitments: towards the development of its firm’s activity, and 
towards the regulator.  
Overall, NPCs provide a useful tool for structuring innovation in the financial services 
industry. When they exist in an explicit organizational form inside a financial firm or a credit 
institution, they tend to be taken seriously: in fact, our observations make us think there is a 
great potential for NPCs to become “hubs” for responsibilization, even though some of their 
constituents may need to be retooled in order to fully serve that purpose. 
 
4. Responsible innovation inside New Products Committees 
In this section, we compare and contrast the organizational form of the NPC with the seven 
different understandings of responsible innovation in finance that we have put forward. We 
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examine, in an exploratory manner, what NPCs bring and can bring to each, and how. This 
results in a pluralistic view that can inform both organizational measures and policy thinking. 
 
4.1. Focus on function 
The NPC is a place in which the function of the product can be discussed and made explicit. It 
literally is a place for explicitness, that is a place where things can get unfolded to the bitter 
ends. Among the current problems which may hamper this is the fact that participants usually 
do not take enough time to prepare (and to prepare for) the NPC. It is sometimes very difficult 
to push a view on an aspect because of deadlines or because of the styles of management that 
emphasize urgency and top-down decision-making. In some cases, NPCs look like a chamber 
in which decisions taken earlier are simply rubber-stamped. Also, NPCs do not consider the 
presence of some kind of an instance to which the function (economic or otherwise) of the 
product ought to be justified. We conjecture that the introduction of an incitation to functional 
explication could serve responsibility: a simple explanation providing the elements justifying 
such an innovation. 
Retooling NPCs in this direction means, at least in part, providing the appropriate 
environment for a proper explanation of the potential functions of the innovation at stake. 
Parties involved in the innovation process need to understand what interests the innovation 
serves and why, and what time frame is required for this work of reflection and explanation. 
A potent device for encouraging functional explanations would be the introduction of an 
interlocutor to whom the functional properties of the innovation should be properly and 
convincingly explained. An external observer, appointed with the necessary confidentiality 
clauses, could stimulate this call for functional explanation. It might be very difficult to 
identify external experts who could take the role of an external, disinterested economist that 
we identified as a pivotal element of the functional perspective on financial innovation.  
Making it mandatory for the person sponsoring the product to be in a position to explain its 
very function would definitely add to the process in that P&L or client satisfaction would not 
be the sole purpose of the product development. Moreover, broadening the functional horizon 
of the product or activity by requesting financial firms to publish – after a six-month delay for 
example – the outcomes of discussions taking place within NPCs might constitute an 
opportunity for functional explicitness: at least, financial innovations with no clear purpose 
(whether economic, social or otherwise) would appear as such.  
 
4.2. Focus on moral rules  
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The NPC’s focus on moral rules revolves around the presence of the compliance officer. The 
NPC is a relay towards regulators, and thus constitutes the place in which this control function 
really acts as a respondent. Compliance officers, who perform a two-fold task (both within the 
financial company and with reference to an external regulator), screen the different aspects of 
the innovation and try to find unaddressed or under-addressed issues, questions that could 
lead for instance to reputational risk, a matter of concern which is difficult to identify and 
control. They also discuss options and decisions and can provide legitimating support to those 
among the participants who might have problems expressing their position (e.g. in some 
institutions support functions such as the back office are in a weaker position compared to 
“productive” business lines).  
But this presence and operation of compliance officers remains rather tacit; even if they 
can rely on a detailed statement that clearly puts forward their pivotal role inside NPCs (see 
CCLRF, 2005, art. 11, or Schmidt Bies, 2004: “Compliance personnel should have an active 
voice in determining whether a particular activity or product constitutes a new product 
requiring review and approval”). It should be made clearer that their role is not limited to 
warranting regulatory verification and conforming innovation. The pivotal role of the 
compliance function opens possibilities towards better discussions and contextualized 
interpretations of the innovation. An active role of triggering questions and orienting answers 
should probably be reaffirmed, building on the symbolic representations framing the function 
(compliance officers are seen, in some organizations, as “high priests” safeguarding the 
morality of practices). The focus on moral rules includes, as we indicated, some sort of a 
“categorical imperative” or a form of moral order that requires a tutelary method:  the indirect 
sanctification of the compliance officer (in the form of a “moral commissar”) may be 
excluded as a valid anthropological alternative, but elements attached to the symbolic 
representations generated by the function could definitely be taken into consideration.  
 
4.3. Focus on internalized values 
The NPC is currently part of in-house banking and financial culture, or at least it is likely to 
become so. Statements produced within this venue are pronounced in the first-person plural. 
Although this could correspond to the blank corporate “us” of marketing communication, it 
can also be part of corporate culture and collective sensemaking inside the organization 
(Argyris and Schön, 1978; Weick, 1995). In one sense, the NPC introduces a series of 
organizational habits, which are the prerequisite for internalizing norms into practices. 
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Strengthening the penetration of responsibility into habits through NPCs can follow the usual 
tracks of cultural engineering: ritual and training.  
Organizational rituals in corporate life (Meyer and Rowan, 1991) refer for example to 
the power of routines materializing in the regularity of meetings, the following of procedures 
and the validation of documents. What sort of managerial innovation could improve NPCs in 
that direction? A form of ritualization such as the formalization of a role hierarchy within the 
NPC could be introduced: for instance, an employee with an associate level would draft the 
minutes, where a vice-president would be in a position to sponsor the NPC. A senior manager 
would be able to chair the NPC, while a managing director would have a veto right. Hence the 
formalization of seniority within NPCs could allow for the creation of rituals, making it 
mandatory for employees who would like, for instance, to sponsor a NPC, to access such a 
position. This way, using NPCs for the development of carefulness within innovation 
processes could contribute to sharing internalized values: taking part in NPCs would be 
considered as a way for employees to each contribute to the co-construction of shared values 
within the organization, while at the same time developing one’s own career within the 
organization. As for training, which is also a role partly attributable to compliance officers, 
NPCs could serve as an entry point for developing a case-based pedagogy (e.g. following the 
Harvard case method), explicitly considering the NPC operation in the context of business 
simulations.  
 
4.4. Focus on aggregate consequences 
The NPC is a place where several forms of simulation and forecasting are played against each 
other, each voicing particular concerns. The usual risk metrics apply: efforts towards 
transforming future events (uncertainties) into identifiable occurrences (risks), as exemplified 
in Case #2, can prove tricky. As specialists of modelling know only too well, it is virtually 
impossible to anticipate the future behaviour of a financial innovation, once it is let loose 
(Knight, 1921, Bernstein, 1995). It may be possible to model the financial evolution of a 
financial innovation under reasonable conditions (e.g. its expected return, the stability of its 
pricing process and of its constitutive elements), taking into account both regular and extreme 
evolutions of the wider context of the financial organization and the economic environment 
(as is currently done with stress testing), but simulating, for example, the path-dependent, 
network-shaped process of innovation, dissemination and its unintended aggregate 
consequences is at best an ex-post scientific venture.  
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Furthermore, aggregate consequences can materialize as result of at least two different 
situations: either as a result of repeated events (a trade or a product) initiated within the same 
institution, or as a consequence of the appropriation of the event by other actors of the field 
(competitors). For this reason, NPCs should be duplicated at the regulatory level, so that an 
external adviser can get the view that autonomous participants cannot structurally contemplate. 
In fact, responsibility for the assessment of structural modifications of the field would mainly 
rely within the regulator, thereby requiring specific modes of regulation. 
With this in mind, the NPC is the place in which the limitations of modelling and 
forecasting can be acknowledged. First, multiplying the angles through which aggregate 
consequences are modelled, and submitting these to qualitative scrutiny is a fair response to 
the limitations of the knowledge upon which decisions are taken. If a model is an aid to 
imagination, it is certainly not a substitute for it (Morgan and Morrison, 1999). Second, the 
NPC can actually commit to the reversibility of its decisions, which can actually be revised in 
the light of the information generated by the practical test of implementation. Several NPC 
related regulations state the need for a regular cycle of reassessment (see 3.3.): however, our 
observations showed that it is sometimes very difficult to make business departments within 
financial firms understand and participate in the reassessment process.  
Once the innovation has been issued and starts generating revenues, employees seem to 
be reluctant to go through a revision process. This difficulty may be specific to finance, since 
other economic activities have been developing more efficient reassessment and recall 
processes (e.g. pharmacovigilance in the pharmacy industry). A solution to promote better 
follow-up on financial innovations may then be to formalize local (national) NPCs, hosted by 
regulators (the AMF or the ACP in France, the FSA in the UK, etc.), where financial firms 
would be obliged to explain privately then publicly the consequences of their innovations. 
The two levels distinguished here would make it possible for the institution to discuss on a 
private basis with the regulator, making the latter aware of what is developing in markets. 
After a delay period (e.g. 6 months), the early developments and preliminary outcomes – 
whether positive or negative – could be presented and discussed between industry participants. 
The results could then be made public: providing early access to the information, while at the 
same time finding ways to maintain a competitive advantage could be a role explicitly given 
to NPCs. 
 
4.5. Focus on accountability 
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During the NPC, several parties define, explain how and accept (or not) to take responsibility 
for some of the elements constituting the product (whether coming from the front office, the 
back office, the legal department, the information technology department, etc.). Retooling the 
NPC within this specific perspective would consist in furthering the discussion on what would 
be done if things turn sour. Making explicit statements allowing for the accountability of NPC 
members would probably help to build a shared commitment towards accountability. During 
the review process, adverse effects or negative externalities for all parties potentially 
impacted could systematically be discussed, by every NPC participant, thereby not restricting 
the close monitoring of negative impacts to the risk department. 
Within Broker A, the post-NPC review process, although required by the procedures, 
was one of the most difficult parts of the global process because the NPC had an acyclic 
existence, being the expression of punctual innovations. Assuring a continuing life for NPCs 
is probably an area for reflection and discussion, so that NPC members make sure the process 
itself does not dissolve once the product or activity has been launched in the market. Holding 
NPC members accountable for this follow-up, either supporting the organization department 
(Broker A) or tying part of the bonus of the business sponsor to his or her ability to 
demonstrate that post-review assessments have been performed (Bank B), could help. 
Consequently, putting in place a system that would take into account staff turnover, with an 
internal recertification process requiring the new joiner to formally reassess the statute of the 
innovation would probably help strengthening the idea of accountability. 
 
4.6. Focus on precaution 
As far as the precautionary perspective is concerned, the NPC should be the place where 
questions about the acceptable amount or proportion of innovation could systematically be 
raised: does the NPC want the innovation to be disseminated on a massive scale, or on the 
contrary, should it begin on a small scale? To the best of our knowledge, this point is not 
addressed today. The introduction of a clinical perspective caring for the experimental nature 
of the product, even after it has been put in the market, would illustrate this direction. This 
could translate for example in the development of feedback indicators inspired by 
pharmacovigilance, protocols for recalling faulty or harmful products, or at least for stopping 
their release.  
For this view to be effective, an industry-wide initiative led by financial institutions and 
regulators could set indicative precautionary thresholds for the size and scope of an 
innovation, preventing full mass-marketing before a testing period. We acknowledge that this 
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proposal may cause problems in terms of competition, but it seems to us a realistic one in 
industrial terms (the pharmaceutical industry has been able to organize such testing 
environments). In this respect, we think investment firms should take an active part in 
developing recall mechanisms that could be activated on demand. These mechanisms could be 
designed to protect both the institution and the wider financial system. 
 
4.7. Focus on democracy 
We have seen that NPCs allow for an informal deliberative process: concerns are voiced by 
multiple parties, discussed and fixed in a collective memory (a data repository, more or less 
easily accessible). NPCs can even play a proto-therapeutic role in the following sense: being 
able to talk and to raise concerns before action is taken may prevent more serious distress 
when facing the consequences of unspoken issues in a catastrophic situation. NPCs should be 
places for genuine discussion or conflicts. This observation raises questions about free and 
effective expression of such concerns within the institution: in other words, how can NPCs 
qualify as internal forums for exchange? How should they be designed to mitigate inequalities 
resulting from organizational charts and functions? 
Keeping this perspective in mind, we suggest the introduction of a procedure making the 
NPC a place where every voice has the same value, irrespective of its (organizational) origin 
or attachment. NPCs should qualify as democratic spaces where members’ status would be 
flattened to produce a level playing field. This would come with an obligation for NPC 
members to take an active part and to express their views (democracy lives when it is used). 
An internal ombudsperson or the compliance officer could both make sure that participants 
abide by this rule (perhaps by signing an “NPC code of conduct”) and protect the less 
powerful members.  
Furthermore, our reflection suggests that the model of public participation in technology 
assessment should be imported into financial innovation: examples seen within technical 
democracy (Callon et al., 2009) could definitely help in making NPCs more open to their 
environment. This point would mean widening the stakeholders, or opening NPCs to external 
participants, such as branch employees, or a panel of clients (e.g. retail investors) who would 
be indirectly impacted by a financial catastrophe generated by the innovation (with reference, 
for instance, to the recent minibond crisis in Asia7). This is a maximalist view, probably an 
                                                 
7. See Shadbolt (2011). 
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impractical one: that would generate adverse effects turning the NPC into some sort of a 
simulacrum where participants would come and play a role with no serious intentions.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Our analysis translates into a set of proposals concerning five areas: the relocation of NPCs at 
the core of professional life in the financial organization; a better formalization of NPCs; a 
better mangement of post-assessment review processes; the emphasis on their nature and their 
role as pertinent devices for embedding democratic mechanisms within financial innovations; 
and the inspection of NPC processes. Those proposals are expressed within the following five 
principles: 
An implication principle, where financial firms would introduce within their HR 
employee development programs evaluations and incentives relating to NPC “membership”. 
In order to foster interest and the personal implication of employees, firms could make it 
mandatory for employees wishing to take top management positions to play an active role 
within NPCs. Conversely, NPC participation could be internally valued and promoted as an 
internal reward for employees focusing on ethical behaviour, not only profits. Senior 
compliance officers together with senior management should be involved in the process of 
nominating “NPC eligible” employees. This would definitely help employees internalize the 
idea of responsible innovation. 
A formalization principle, where financial firms would need to follow a common 
framework for the description of the innovation at stake, summarizing the key proposals 
concerning the elements discussed, the information stored and published. Current regulation 
do not systematically provide a framework, which results in a rather heterogenous approach to 
the NPC issue. The framework could be as such: a detailed description of the product or 
activity (that is, understandable by a non-expert), an explanation of the pupose of the product 
or activity (for the firm, its clients, etc.), an explanation of potential externalities (for the firm, 
its clients, etc.), an assessment of the limits to modeling and forecasting encurred by the 
product or activity, an assessment of the size and scope of the product or activity 
dissemination, and finally an explicit signing by all relevant functions (including relevant re-
certification if needed). 
A revision principle, where financial firms would have an obligation to better formalize 
NPC reviewing processes. At present, such mechanisms do exist in the majority of 
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regulations8, and chances are that the majority of financial actors have written procedures 
providing such arrangements. However, our discussions with professionals, supplemented by 
in situ observations showed that the reviewing process is not systematic. Extending and 
clarifying the NPC as an institution would encourage the development of responsible 
innovation in finance. Detailed indications for their governance are definitely required. Within 
this specification effort, NPCs should be defined, at least in part, as organizational devices in 
which the responsibility for the innovation is correctly debated and fully assumed. Efforts 
towards greater responsibility mean, in this respect, being in a position to meet regularly to 
assess the effects of innovation in an ever changing environment, particularly when the 
innovation might have had an influence on the changes observed. 
A publication principle, where financial firms would have an obligation to produce NPC 
related documents as justification for the development of their innovations. These documents 
would be made accessible on their institutional websites and lodged in a national database. 
Regulators would need to define the nature and amount of information to be disclosed 
precisely, with a view to making outcomes and externalities (that is, justification) obvious to 
anyone interested in that kind of knowledge. Here, we could imagine a formal process where 
interested parties could publicly express their concerns about the innovation under 
consideration, and ask for clarification. This should lead to a true deliberative democracy, 
with firms engaging in a constructive dialogue with the public, because maintaining a 
dedicated space for discussion constitutes the essence of effective democracy.  
An auditing principle, where NPCs could be inspected on a random basis by a third-
party, for example a regulator. Random inspections would facilitate the internalization of 
responsibility and accountability by NPC members. We suggest introducing this disciplining 
technique in the organization of the innovation process, where members of the NPC would 
need to perform genuinely: not knowing if their way to embody their function, as members of 
the innovation process, would or would not be supervised by this third-party. Knowing that 
the committee is auditable at any moment would definitely help transforming the routine 
character of NPCs, which sometimes are just rubber stamps. Failure to follow the implication, 
                                                 
8. See, e.g. CCLRF (2005, art. 32-1): “Reporting institutions shall regularly re-evaluate their systems for 
measuring risk and determining limits in order to verify their relevance in the light of developments in the 
business, the market environment, the macroeconomic environment in which it operates in relation to the 
business cycle and analytical techniques”. 
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the formalization, the revision and the publication principles should lead to sanctions, starting 
with the partial or full ban on new product and activity development.  
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